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Abstract: 
Limited access to low-cost financing is an impediment to high-velocity 
technological diffusion and high grid penetration of solar photovoltaic (PV) 
technology.  Securitization of solar assets provides a potential solution to this 
problem.  This paper assesses the viability of solar asset-backed securities 
(ABS) as a lower cost financing mechanism and identifies policies that could 
facilitate implementation of securitization.  First, traditional solar financing is 
examined to provide a baseline for cost comparisons.  Next, the securitization 
process is modeled.  The model enables identification of several junctures at 
which risk, and uncertainty influences costs.  Next, parameter values are 
assigned and used to generate cost estimates.  Results show that, under 
reasonable assumptions, securitization of solar power purchase agreements 
(PPA) can significantly reduce project financing costs, suggesting 
securitization is a viable mechanism for improving the financing of PV 
projects.  The clear impediment to the successful launch of a solar ABS is 
measuring and understanding the riskiness of underlying assets.  This study 
identifies three classes of policy intervention that lower the cost of ABS by 
reducing risk or by improving the measurement of risk: i) standardization of 
contracts and the contracting process, ii) improved access to contract and 
equipment performance data, and iii) geographic diversification.   
Keywords: photovoltaic; renewable energy financing; securitization 
1. Introduction  
 Over the last decade the solar photovoltaic industry (PV) has grown 
rapidly, gaining momentum from plummeting module costs, public interest in 
sustainable energy, and favorable policy support (Branker and Pearce, 2010; 
BNEF, 2012; IREC, 2012; SEIA, 2011).  Taken together, in 2013 these 
factors propelled the US to become one of only four nations to surpass 10 
GW of installed PV capacity, 83% of which was installed after 2010 (Solar 
Industry, 2013).  Given PV’s ability to produce energy inexpensively, 
reliably, and sustainably (Pearce, 2002; Prindle et al., 2007; Timilsina et al., 
2012; Branker, et al., 2011a), high levels of demand for new PV projects are 
expected to continue.  However, there are significant capital requirements for 
transforming demand into installed PV capacity.  For example, installation of 
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3.3 GW of solar capacity in 2012 cost $12 billion (Barbose et al., 2013).  If 
market growth is to continue, solar developers require access to adequate 
financial capital.  This capital is not available through the traditional tax 
equity market.  Faced with both impending reductions in federal tax support 
and stricter capital requirements on banks, solar developers are looking for 
alternatives. 
 Solar asset-backed securities (ABS) are being explored as a promising 
option (Bolinger et al., 2009; Bolinger, 2009; Wilkins, 2002; Pietruszko, 
2006; Branker et al., 2011b).  By delivering access to the more than $100 
trillion pool of wealth managed by institutional and other investors, solar 
ABS has the potential to lower financing costs, and expand access to funding 
(Mendelsohn, 2013; UPI, 2011).  This could be particularly beneficial to the 
development of smaller scale solar projects, where the funding environment 
is particularly challenging (Miller, 2012).   
 Though securitization has enabled other asset classes to successfully 
attract financial capital, there are several challenges impeding its widespread 
utilization by the solar industry (Herndon, 2012; Trabish, 2012).  To facilitate 
the introduction of this new asset class, policymakers must understand the 
risks associated with different aspects of the asset, and look for ways to 
mitigate these risks.  This paper focuses on three points at which risk and 
uncertainty affect the securitization process: 1) in the formation of the asset 
pool where there is uncertainty over off-taker behavior, 2) in the process of 
asset evaluation, and 3) in the purchase of the asset by uncertain investors.  
 By incorporating each of these well-known uncertainties in a simple 
model, the paper is able to evaluate their impacts on the cost of financing, 
and on the ability to raise capital through securitization.  The model focuses 
on the securitization of solar PPAs, using parameterization to assess the 
importance of changes in key variables.  A range of conditions under which 
ABS can successfully reduce costs is also identified using the cost of 
traditional solar financing as an upper bound.  This information is useful in 
evaluating the benefit of different efforts to promote solar ABS.   
 There are many ongoing efforts to enact or create policies that will 
generate the conditions necessary for successful deployment of solar ABS.  
These policies are reviewed, and assessed according to their targeted point of 
impact.  This allows interpretation of their potential influence on the cost of 
raising capital through securitization. With the information gleaned from the 
model, guidance is developed to target policies that play a significant role in 
determining the viability of securitization for the PV industry.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 Traditional PV Finance 
 Since passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 the federal 
government has used tax benefits to promote the solar power industry.  While 
the benefits are generous, equaling between 50% and 60% of a solar project’s 
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installed cost (Bolinger et al., 2009a) much of this does not accrue to the 
solar developer.  Solar development firms are typically small and possess 
little tax liability.  They are unable to directly capture the value of federal 
support and instead exchange tax benefits for funding in the tax-equity 
finance market.     
 This type of financing is expensive, limited in supply and restricts a 
firm’s ability to incorporate other forms of financing.  In recent years, use of 
a third-party to monetize tax benefits, has resulted in borrowing costs of 12 – 
20 percent depending on leverage (Minzt, 2010; Sanders et al., 2013; US 
PREF, 2011).  Despite these high rates of return, the supply of tax-equity 
financing is very limited.  With fewer than 20 U.S. taxable entities (primarily 
large investment banks, commercial banks, and insurance companies) 
actively participating in the tax-equity market (BNEF, 2012), only $3 - $6 
billion of funding has been available for the entire renewable energy sector 
annually (Mendelsohn and Harper, 2012).  For firms using tax equity 
financing, incorporation of cost reducing project level debt is very difficult as 
it increases risk for equity financiers (Mendelsohn, et al., 2012).  These 
problems have motivated firms to seek alternate forms of financing. 
 
2.2 Solar Asset-Backed Securities 
 Progress is being made towards the creation of a large and efficient 
solar ABS market that could supply adequate capital to the PV market.  In 
2013, leasing specialist SolarCity raised $54 million with their solar ABS 
issuance (Parkinson, 2013).  While this is a significant step in the maturation 
of solar financing, it is quite small in size relative to the $800 million average 
value of ABS issued in other asset classes (Mendelsohn, 2012).  Replication 
and expansion of SolarCity’s success depends on improving efficiency and 
performance during each stage of the securitization process.  Many policies 
have been suggested in pursuit of this goal. 
 By considering the point at which these policy efforts impact the 
process, it is possible to evaluate their potential role in the success of 
securitization.  Formation of the asset pool is the first point of intervention 
considered.  Decisions in the process of screening consumers, writing 
contracts and pooling assets determines the quality of the asset pool as 
measured by the rate of early contract termination. To understand how the 
rate of early contract termination influences the success of securitization, the 
process is modeled.  The estimated cost of increases in the default rate can 
provide guidance for policy intervention and developer action.  Asset 
evaluation by a rating agency is the next point of potential intervention.  
Raters must assess an assets’ risk, but have limited data with which to make 
their assessments.  The degree to which their estimates are erroneous 
influences the success of the securitization.  Separating rater error from the 
contract default rate allows for particular attention to the benefit of policies 
focused on the rating process.  Finally, the point at which the investor 
purchases the solar ABS is considered.  Rates of return reflect investors’ 
perceptions of the riskiness of the asset.  Policies that lower required rates of 
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return will reduce financing costs.  The following model deconstructs the 
securitization process revealing the specific roles played by three PV-related 
uncertainties on the market valuation of a proffered solar ABS.   
 
3. Model 
 Measurement of the cost of financial capital raised through 
securitization begins with cash flow analysis.  The solar developer’s, or 
originator’s, cash flows depend on the performance of its PPAs.  The 
originator can hold these contracts for their duration, ensuring a long-term 
annual income stream, or it can sell PPAs to a special purpose entity (SPE) to 
raise immediate capital.  The difference between the discounted value of the 
cash flows to the originator and the sale price of the PPAs determines the PV 
developer’s cost of capital (Stone and Zissu, 2005; Fabozzi, 2012).     
3.1 Value of Discounted Cash Flow - Originator 
 Begin by assuming a solar developer originates m0 number of PPAs.  
For simplicity, assume these contracts are identical, are originated 
simultaneously, and have a 20-year lifespan (Cory, 2009).  The rights and 
obligations specified by the PPAs establish an anticipated value for 
contracted receivables in the third-party ownership structure.  Though these 
contracts are complex, for modeling purposes they can be simplified to a few 
essential components: i) amount of electricity contracted, ii) unit price of 
electricity, and iii) recovery procedures in the case of contract termination.    
 Under the PPA, the consumer pays the system owner for 100% of the 
electricity produced by the installed PV system.  At the time of installation, 
all systems are capable of producing an annual output of e0 kWh of electricity 
per year.  Small system degradation causes this value to decline over the life 
of the contract.  Therefore, annual energy output [kWh] can be rewritten:   
  (1) 
where α is a constant annual degradation rate and t is the number of years. 
The system operates at full capacity during its first year of operation.   
 Contract default is the primary source of cash flow uncertainty, and 
impacts revenues by reducing the total energy output under contract.  
Liability will fall on the consumer if early termination is the result of 
consumer bankruptcy, sale of home, or purposeful termination by the 
consumer in response to changes in technology or energy costs (Rahus, 2008; 
CARICOM, 2012; FUTUREGEN, 2012).   Under the standardized 
residential PPA produced by SAPC, defaulting consumers are liable for all 
unpaid balances, the cost of returning the system, and all costs incurred by 
the owner in recovery (SAPC, 2013).  The stringency of these default 
remedies should reduce frivolous payment avoidance, but it will not stop 
default in cases where the consumer is unable to pay.  Under these 
circumstances, full, timely recovery of payments due is highly unlikely.   
 T. Alafita and J.M. Pearce, "Securitization of residential solar photovoltaic assets: Costs, risks and uncertainty", 
Energy Policy, 67, pp. 488–498 (2014). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.045 
5 
 Given the uncertainty of the timing, and success of recovery 
procedures, liability payments are not included in assessed cash flows.  
Instead, for simplicity, a recovery rate of zero is assumed (KBR, 2012).  
When a contract fails, the stream of associated payments is terminated, and it 
is removed from the asset pool.  Contracts fail at an annual rate of β.  Actual 
termination rates will reflect system owner characteristics, economic 
conditions, and energy market conditions.  Though these vary over time, for 
simplicity the contract termination rate is assumed to be constant over the life 
of the ABS.  The total number of contracts at time t is given by: 
    (2) 
where mo is the number of contracts included in pool initially.  All contracts 
are assumed to be active during their first year.  Based on equations (1) and 
(2), the annual amount of energy under contract by the pooled PPAs is equal 
to: 
  (3) 
Electricity prices are the final determinant of cash flows.  A single price, p0, 
is applied to all contracts.  This price increases by a constant annual 
escalation rate of γ, making the $/kWh price of electricity in any given 
period:  
       (4) 
Using equations (3) and (4), annual cash flows are given by 
 (5) 
The total real value of the contracts to the originator is: 
   (6) 
where δ is the risk-free discount rate. 
 
3.2 Valuation of Discounted Cash Flow – Investor 
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the entities involved in 
securitization by providing a brief description of their rights and 
responsibilities. 
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Figure 1: Process of Securitization 
 
As shown in Figure 1, each entity involved in the securitization process 
requires payment (Stone and Zissu, 2005).  Credit enhancement is the first 
cost incorporated into the model.  To achieve the high credit rating required 
for an investment grade asset, credit enhancement is used to offset the 
riskiness of underlying assets (Fabozzi, 2007).  While there are many 
potential forms of credit enhancement, overcollateralization is used in this 
analysis.  Under this method, the par value of issued securities is lower than 
the value of the collateral (Fabozzi, 2004) - the more overcollateralization 
required, the less capital can be raised from the asset pool.   
 Let θ be the amount of overcollateralization required.   θ is the percent 
of contracts set aside each year to cover potential contract defaults.  It is 
assumed that overcollateralization is always sufficient to ensure payment of 
investor obligations.  However, credit rating agencies are not always correct 
in predicting actual default rates.   Therefore, if θ is the amount of 
overcollateralization required, the difference between this value and the 
actual rate of early contract termination (β) will be: , 
where σ is excess overcollateralization.   Separation of overcollateralization 
into its required and its excess components allows closer consideration of 
both the impacts of responsible contract issuance and accurate risk evaluation 
by credit rating agencies on the cost of securitization.   
 T. Alafita and J.M. Pearce, "Securitization of residential solar photovoltaic assets: Costs, risks and uncertainty", 
Energy Policy, 67, pp. 488–498 (2014). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.045 
7 
 Credit enhancement is incorporated in the model in a manner similar 
to β.  cts, the annual cash flows included in the securitization,  are given by 
equation (7), where the number of contracts is influenced by .  
    (7) 
Next, servicing fees are deducted from cash flows (Wishnia, 2010).  Let the 
servicing fee be a percentage of annual revenues, η, so that the annual fee 
paid to the servicing agent, Ft, is given by 
  (8) 
This value is subtracted from annual cash flows.   
 Finally, the cost of investor return is incorporated in the cash flow 
analysis.  In equation (6), cash flows are discounted at δ, the risk-free level.  
Investors require a higher rate of return as compensation for risk.  If that risk 
premium is given by μ, then the rate of return to the solar ABS is . 
When investor returns are accounted for, the present value of the income 
stream generated by the PPAs included in the securitization pool is given by: 
  (9) 
 
Because CABS must be sufficient to cover all ABS payment obligations, it 
must be true that the present value of expected cash flows from the 
underlying collateral net all securitization costs is equal to the present value 
of the income stream from the ABS.  Consequently, this value is also equal to 
the market price of the securities (Zhang, 2011; Coval et al., 2009).   
 
3.3 Cost of Capital 
Internal rate of return (IRR) is used to assess the originator’s cost of capital.  
This technique calculates the interest rate that brings a series of cash flows to 
a net present value of zero.  IRR is calculated as: 
 
 
Reflected in the equation is the receipt of payment for issued securities in the 
initial period, t = 0. This is a positive value equal to CABS.  In return for 
immediate access to capital, the originator foregoes the stream of cash flows 
ct, over the subsequent 20 years.  The cost of foregone cash flows is offset in 
the final period by the reimbursement of any excess funds from credit 
enhancement.  Overcollateralization generates excess funds when the actual 
default rate is less than the expected default rate, θ > β.  Any interest earned 
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on this accumulated capital is kept by the servicing agent, while the 
remainder returns to the originator when all obligations are met.  Funds in 
this account are equal to the sum of nominal net cash flows in each time 
period. 
 
4. Results 
 There are three points in the securitization process that are of 
particular interest: 1) the formation of the asset pool, 2) the process of asset 
evaluation, and 3) the purchase of the asset by uncertain investors.    To 
assess the extent to which a securitization’s outcome is influenced by these 
moments, three variables are analyzed - the rate of early contract termination, 
β; excess overcollateralization required by rating agencies, σ; and the rate of 
return required by investors, r.  The model is parameterized and all other 
variables are assigned fixed values.  β, σ, and r are each assigned a range of 
possible values and a sensitivity analysis is performed.  Values are listed in 
Table 1.  
Table 1: Values of Variables Included in Base Case 
Variable Definition Units Value 
mo Number of contracts included 
in pool 
Thousands 100 
e0 Initial annual electricity 
output of installed PV system 
kWh/year 11,000 (EIA, 
2012) 
α PV system degradation rate %/year 0.5 (Chianese, et 
al., 2003; Jordan, 
2011; Realini, 
2003; Va'zquez , 
2008) 
γ Price escalation rate %/year 2 (Akins, 2009; 
EIA, 2012b; 
Shah, 2011) 
P Initial price of electricity $/kWh 0.10 (EIA, 2012a) 
δ Zero coupon treasury rate % 2 (Wall Street 
Journal, 2013) 
η Servicing Fee % 1 (Furletti, 2002) 
r Investor return % 6 through 12 
β Rate of early contract 
termination  
%/year 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 
15 
σ Difference between actual and 
expected rate of early 
termination 
%/year 0 through 8 
 
 β is appraised over a range of values from 0 to 15 percent per year. 
This range is quite broad due to significant uncertainty regarding rates of 
early contract termination.  In the nascent market for home-based solar PV 
systems there is only about five years of data on contract defaults for 
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residential PPAs (Colmer, 2013).  Incorporation of several options allows the 
impact of changes in the actual default rate on the cost of capital to be 
studied.   
 A similar range is used to evaluate σ.  The value of this variable 
depends on the confidence of credit rating agencies in their ability to 
accurately predict the rate of early contract termination.  It should be noted 
here that the technical risk associated with PV technology itself is small, as 
there are well-documented decades of performance data throughout the world 
to draw on for predicting solar electricity generation rates and levelized cost 
calculations (Branker, Pathak and Pearce, 2011). However, early contract 
termination data is not as readily available.  Give the absence of historical 
data, their limited technical familiarity, and their narrow industry experience, 
raters are expected to be quite uncertain. Uncertainty increases the perceived 
riskiness of the underlying assets, resulting in higher rates of 
overcollateralization.  In this analysis σ is limited to 16 percent per year in 
order focus on values at which securitization is a viable alternative.  It is 
anticipated that risk assessment accuracy would increase with experience. 
 To evaluate the importance of r, the rate of investor returns, values 
between 6 and 12 percent are included in the analysis.  In order to attract 
investors, solar ABS must promise a rate of return sufficient to compensate 
for the time value of money and the risk associated with the investment 
product.  The lower bound for these rates is based on return targets expressed 
by mutual fund, retail investor, and pension fund managers during interviews 
conducted by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF, 2012).  As the 
estimated cost of equity financing, 12% is the rate at which securitization 
ceases to be attractive (Bolinger, 2009; Minzt, 2010; US PREF, 2011).  It is 
therefore selected as an upper limit on the rate of return.  
   
4.1 Cost of Securitization, IRR 
 Table 2 presents specific values for IRR based on different 
combinations of σ, β, and r. Using 12% as the approximate cost of tax equity 
financing, Table 1 demonstrates that for many reasonably anticipated 
combinations of β, σ, and r securitization will reduce financing costs.  
Variable combinations that meet this cost reducing criteria are shaded.  Given 
the variable ranges specified, 6.12% is the lowest potential cost of financing 
calculated.   
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Table 2: Cost of Financing Solar Projects Using Securitization, based on 
different combinations of β, σ, and r. 
 
 Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 0 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
) 6 6.12 6.45 6.85 7.34 7.91 8.59 9.37 10.25 11.22 
7 7.12 7.50 7.95 8.49 9.12 9.84 10.66 11.56 12.55 
8 8.13 8.55 9.05 9.63 10.30 11.07 11.91 12.84 13.83 
9 9.13 9.60 10.14 10.76 11.48 12.27 13.14 14.08 15.08 
10 10.14 10.64 11.22 11.89 12.63 13.45 14.35 15.30 16.31 
11 11.15 11.69 12.31 13.00 13.78 14.62 15.53 16.50 17.51 
 
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 1 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
) 6 6.12 6.47 6.88 7.38 7.98 8.67 9.47 10.37 11.35 
7 7.13 7.52 7.98 8.54 9.18 9.92 10.76 11.67 12.67 
8 8.13 8.57 9.08 9.68 10.37 11.15 12.01 12.95 13.95 
9 9.14 9.62 10.17 10.81 11.54 12.35 13.23 14.19 15.19 
10 10.15 10.66 11.26 11.94 12.70 13.53 14.44 15.40 16.41 
11 11.15 11.71 12.34 13.05 13.84 14.70 15.62 16.59 17.61 
 
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 3 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
) 6 6.13 6.50 6.94 7.47 8.10 8.84 9.67 10.59 11.59 
7 7.14 7.55 8.05 8.63 9.31 10.08 10.95 11.89 12.90 
8 8.14 8.61 9.15 9.78 10.50 11.31 12.19 13.15 14.17 
9 9.15 9.65 10.24 10.91 11.67 12.50 13.41 14.38 15.40 
10 10.16 10.70 11.33 12.04 12.82 13.68 14.61 15.59 16.61 
11 11.16 11.75 12.41 13.15 13.96 14.84 15.78 16.77 17.79 
 
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 5 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
) 6 6.14 6.53 7.01 7.57 8.23 8.99 9.86 10.80 11.82 
7 7.15 7.59 8.11 8.73 9.44 10.24 11.13 12.09 13.12 
8 8.16 8.64 9.22 9.88 10.62 11.46 12.37 13.34 14.37 
9 9.16 9.69 10.31 11.01 11.79 12.65 13.58 14.56 15.59 
10 10.17 10.74 11.40 12.13 12.94 13.82 14.77 15.76 16.79 
11 11.18 11.79 12.48 13.24 14.08 14.98 15.93 16.93 17.96 
 
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 7 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 
Re
tu
rn
 
(%
) 
6 6.15 6.57 7.07 7.66 8.36 9.15 10.04 11.00 12.04 
7 7.16 7.63 8.18 8.83 9.56 10.39 11.30 12.28 13.32 
8 8.17 8.68 9.28 9.97 10.75 11.60 12.53 13.52 14.56 
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9 9.18 9.73 10.38 11.10 11.91 12.79 13.74 14.73 15.77 
10 10.18 10.78 11.46 12.22 13.06 13.96 14.91 15.92 16.95 
11 11.19 11.83 12.54 13.33 14.19 15.11 16.07 17.08 18.12 
 
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 10 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
) 6 6.17 6.63 7.17 7.80 8.54 9.37 10.29 11.28 12.33 
7 7.18 7.69 8.28 8.97 9.84 10.60 11.54 12.54 13.59 
8 8.19 8.74 9.38 10.11 10.92 11.81 12.76 13.76 14.81 
9 9.20 9.80 10.48 11.24 12.08 12.99 13.95 14.96 16.00 
10 10.21 10.84 11.56 12.36 13.22 14.14 15.12 16.13 17.17 
11 11.21 11.89 12.64 13.46 14.34 15.28 16.26 17.28 18.32 
 
Rate of Early Contract Termination (β) = 15 
  
Credit Enhancement (% above default rate) 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
In
ve
st
or
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
) 6 6.21 6.72 7.32 8.02 8.81 9.69 10.65 11.67 12.73 
7 7.22 7.78 8.44 9.18 10.01 10.91 11.88 12.90 13.95 
8 8.23 8.84 9.54 10.32 11.18 12.10 13.08 14.10 15.15 
9 9.24 9.89 10.63 11.44 12.32 13.26 14.25 15.27 16.32 
10 10.25 10.94 11.71 12.55 13.45 14.40 15.39 16.41 17.46 
11 11.26 11.99 12.79 13.65 14.56 15.52 16.52 17.54 18.59 
 
4.2 Rate of Early Contract Termination, β and the Performance of 
Securitization 
 When adequate credit enhancement is assumed, β is far more relevant 
to the ability to raise capital, than it is to the cost of capital.    Values 
presented in Table 2 show that increases in β cause only a very limited 
decrease in the number of potential cost reducing combinations of σ and r, 
and have little impact on the cost of financing.  For example, if σ and r are 
equal to 0 and 6 percent respectively, a 5 percent increase in β from 10 to 15 
percent increases IRR by only 0.04 percent. This negligible effect is a result 
of the use of foregone cash flows, rather than potential cash flows, in the 
determination of costs (Bragg, 2012).  Because the default rate is the same 
whether contracts are held for their duration, or securitized, the loss of cash 
flow is not attributable to securitization and impacts cost mainly through 
interaction with σ.  
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Figure 2: Cash Flows from Asset Pool, given different Rates of 
Overcollateralization (θ =β+σ) 
 
 However, securitization can also be evaluated by its ability to raise 
capital from a given pool of PPAs.  β is critical in determining the price of 
solar ABS.  By eliminating cash flows from the asset pool, early contract 
termination reduces the value of the assets and lowers the potential market 
value of the securities.  This effect is compounded when additional cash 
flows are diverted due to excess overcollateralization. Required credit 
enhancement, θ, depends on the combined value of β and σ.  Figure 2 shows 
the nominal value of annual cash flows generated by the pool of assets under 
different assumptions about θ.  Though receipts in year 1 are the same under 
all values, these payments quickly diverge resulting in disparate cash flow 
profiles.       
 The impact of these alternative cash flow profiles on the value of a 
proffered security is depicted in Figure 3.  The higher θ, the less capital can 
be raised from the pooled PPAs.  However, changes in θ have a larger impact 
on security prices when θ is low than when θ is high.  Consequently, there is 
a benefit to improving the quality of even high-quality asset pools.  For 
example, when r is 6%, by reducing θ from 4% to 3%, the originator can 
raise an additional $77.6 million.  The value of the same 1% decrease in θ is 
$107.2 million when θ is reduced from 1% to 0%.   
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Figure 3: Impact of Overcollateralization on Security Price at different 
Rates of Investor Return. 
 
 
4.3 Rate of Excess Overcollateralization, σ, and the Performance of 
Securitization 
 Inaccurate risk assessment reduces the performance of securitization 
by both increasing financing costs and reducing security prices.  Figure 4 
depicts the impact of changes in σ on the cost of financing at different levels 
of β.  The graph shows that rater inaccuracy always increases financing costs.  
Additionally, it demonstrates that incremental cost increases are 
progressively larger as the degree of accuracy declines.  An increase in σ 
from 0 to 1 percent adds 0.34 percent to IRR, while a similar change from 7 
to 8 percent increases IRR by 0.98 percent (β = 0, r = 6).     
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Figure 4: Impact of Increases in Excess Overcollateralization on IRR 
 
 Rater inaccuracy is also more costly when the quality of the asset pool 
is low.  As β increases, a larger portion of future cash flows are eliminated, 
rather than set aside to cover potential losses, as they are for increases in σ.  
Income accumulated as a result of this set-aside is returned to the originator 
when all obligations have been settled.  At higher levels of β, total cash flows 
are lower; meaning the cost of setting aside the stream of income required by 
σ is more costly.  
 Excess overcollateralization has the same impact on security prices as 
the rate of contract default.  Assuming that require overcollateralization is 
always adequate, these both affect the security’s price by adding to the total 
overcollateralization demand by the rating agency.  Figure 3 illustrates how 
security prices decline as credit enhancement costs increase. 
 
4.4 Rate of Investor Return, r, and the Performance of Securitization 
 While the rate of investor return influences both the cost of financing 
and the price of the security, its clearest and most significant impact is felt in 
the cost of financing.  If both β and σ are set equal to zero, then IRR differs 
only slightly from r.  In Table 2, when r = 6, then IRR = 6.12, and when r = 
11, IRR = 11.15.  IRR increases by approximately 1.01% as r increases by 
1%.  There is also an important interaction between σ and r. At higher levels 
of σ, changes in r result in increasingly large changes in IRR.  Because σ 
measures the inaccuracy of credit rating agencies, this result shows part of 
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the cost of imperfect information.  Excess overcollateralization magnifies the 
impact of increases in r, swelling the rate of increase in the IRR.        
 When investors require higher rates of return, the amount of capital 
that can be raised based on a particular asset pool is reduced.  The size of this 
effect is influenced by θ.  Changes in r have a larger impact on price when θ 
is low, than when θ is high.  In Figure 3, when θ = 15%, raising r from 6% to 
11% reduces the security price by 106 million, or by 19.5%.  When θ = 0%, 
the same change in r reduces price by $402 million, or 31%. As a result, the 
relative importance of θ and r in determining security prices depends on the 
level of θ.  When θ exceeds 11%, the security price benefit of reducing θ 
exceeds the benefit of a similar percentage reduction in r.  For values of θ 
below 11%, greater price benefits can be achieved by reducing r.  
 
5. Policy Implications 
 In revealing how changes in the values of β, σ, and r influence the 
success of securitization, the model provides targets for policy intervention to 
facilitate the development of an efficient market for securitized solar assets.   
These policies are organized according to the point at which they impact the 
securitization process.  This helps clarify the policy’s intended goal as it 
relates to the model’s results 
5.1 Formation of the Asset Pool and the Rate of Early Contract 
Termination, β 
 The investigation of the role of asset formation, as measured by the 
rate of early policy termination, reveals two outcomes.  First, when the 
originator is responsible for providing adequate credit enhancement, changes 
in the quality of the asset pool have little impact on the cost of financing.  
Instead, the benefit of reducing β comes nearly entirely from the ability to 
raise more capital from a given pool of assets.  This implies that solar 
developers have a strong incentive to implement and adhere to strict credit 
evaluation procedures when issuing PPAs.  With little need to use legal 
authority to compel participation or compliance, policies to enhance this 
process could be promulgated by a trade organization or an independent 
industry representative.   
5.1.1 Standardization 
 In 2013, the Solar Access to Public Capital (SAPC) working group 
released three standard contract templates (NREL, 2013).  They represent the 
work of more than 120 member organizations, and are the culmination of the 
widely recognized need for standardization of contracts and contracting 
procedures (Colmer, 2011; Hu, 2012; NREL, 2013).  There are two ways in 
which the widespread adoption of a standardized contract would benefit solar 
developers by facilitating the creation of high quality asset pools (reducing 
β).  First, creating a solar ABS market of efficient size necessitates the 
pooling of assets across firms.  Such pooling requires that contracts and 
contracting procedures be standardized.  Investors are looking for minimum 
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transaction sizes of $100 – $200 million (Joshi, 2012), and prefer issuance of 
over $350 million (Nelson et al., 2013).  Despite rapid growth in the 
residential third-party ownership market, no individual firm currently owns 
sufficient PPAs to accomplish an issuance of this size (Colmer, 2013).   Also, 
there are a large number of smaller solar developers who could benefit from 
the type of pooling possible with contract standardization.  These developers 
have had difficulty finding financing because investors are not generally 
interested in projects of less than $30 million (Di Capua, et al. 2011), leaving 
projects of 5MW or less without an effective small-scale financing structure 
that can efficiently generate returns for all parties involved (Miller, 2012).  
 Next, standardization simplifies data collection and analysis.  Such 
data collection is necessary given the short history and evolving use of third-
party ownership in residential solar (S&P, 2012).  Standardization would 
streamline the pooling of data to increase observation points, and expand 
diversity within the sample, improving the potential for statistical analysis.  
For developers, data analysis could provide feedback that would improve 
credit screening and contracting procedures.   
 Data collected by the Connecticut (CT) Solar Lease Program provides 
a glimpse of the potential value of establishing a larger database to track asset 
performance.  The CT Solar Lease Program, launched in 2008 as a public-
private partnership, provided 855 leases to homeowners throughout the state 
(Speer, 2012).  The performance of those leases was tracked, creating a 
longitudinal database that includes socioeconomic data on the lessees, paired 
with their payment activity (Speer, 2012).  If expanded to include a broader, 
more diverse set of assets, this sort of data could be used develop credit 
evaluation tools and standards.  A national effort to collect and analyze this 
data could draw from the example of two organizations, the Open Solar 
Peformance and Reliability Clearinghouse (O-SPaRC) and the truSolar 
working group.  In 2013 O-SPaRC launched a national database for tracking 
the performance of solar installations (NREL, 2013) following early work in 
Canada to provide open access to data to assist the PV industry develop 
(Buitenhuis and Pearce, 2012; Pearce, Babasola and Andrews, 2012).  Data 
collection relies on the self-interest of industry members to motivate 
participation (Montgomery, 2013).  A similar structure could be developed to 
collect performance information.  In another effort, truSolar, an industry 
consortium, is working to establish a system for sharing asset performance 
data within the commercial and industrial solar segment (truSolar, 2013).  
Firms in the residential sector of the market could follow this example, 
establishing an independent organization to collect and analyze applicable 
data or work with established organizations like NREL.   
 As an important component in the process of pooling and information 
production, firms are unlikely to need inducement to adopt standardized 
contracts.  Model estimation suggests that by aggregating assets to issue solar 
ABS a firm can reduce their financing cost by between 5 and 13 percent.  
Results also indicate that when the quality of the asset pool is improved, 
reducing the default rate by 1%, the capital raised by the issuance can 
increase by 6%.  These potential gains provide firms with substantial 
incentive to adopt standardization.    
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5.1.2 Geographic Diversification 
 Though there has been rapid growth in the use of third-party financing 
for residential solar, much of that growth is located in the state of California 
(Joshi, 2012; SEIA, 2013).  Geographic concentration of this sort exposes the 
asset pool to the risk of significant increases in default rates in response to a 
natural or manmade disaster, decline of regional industry, or change in state 
policy related to solar.  This risk creates a clear mandate for national 
expansion.  However, state policy variations make this change difficult. 
    Differences in state policy impede expansion of residential PV in 
several ways.   States have different laws governing utility contracts that 
restrict allowable activity (Kwan, 2012).  For example, there are only 22 
states (plus D.C. and Puerto Rico) that allow the use of third-party PPA’s 
(DSIRE, 2013).  State to state differences also limit market expansion by 
increasing the legal and analytical expertise required for market participation 
(Burns and Kang, 2012).  This drives up costs, and reduces developer interest 
(Mendelsohn, 2012).  Additionally, in many locations there is a perceived 
lack of policy commitment.  Changes in policy can undermine a project’s 
financial viability making developers wary of investing (Nelson and 
Peirpont, 2013).  Taken together, these problems led Paul Durbin, a 
renewable energy attorney to state, “…when it comes to renewable energy 
development there are only a handful of states where you can get it done…” 
(Lussenburg et al., 2011).  
 It will take the application of significant time and resources to 
improve this situation.  Unlike solar developers, states do not necessarily 
have strong incentives to adjust their policies in ways that benefit the solar 
power industry.  Despite widespread support in the public for distributed 
solar energy (e.g. more than 90% want greater reliance on solar) (Greenberg, 
2009), policies and procedures in most states still favor conventional 
centralized electricity generation and distribution.  Inter-state coordination 
would benefit from federal inducement, but in the current political 
environment this sort of intervention is unlikely without significant political 
change.  Rather, it is continual pressure by interested developers that appears 
clear to motivate gradual change, reinforcing the growing strength of a 
maturing industry.  
 
5.2 Asset Evaluation and the Rate of Excess Overcollateralization, σ. 
 Usually a rating agency would use historical data to forecast asset 
default rates (Fabozzi, 2008; Hu, 2011).  This data is not available for 
residential PV PPAs.  Instead, raters are looking for appropriate proxy data, 
and are considering the use of utility or mortgage default rates (KBR, 2012).  
While similar, these do not capture industry specific risks like technological 
improvement, or home sale (Colmer, 2013).  This reduces the accuracy of the 
risk assessment, increases the amount of credit enhancement required, and 
hinders the performance of securitization. 
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 Two approaches can be used to address this problem.  First, the 
industry can improve its data collection and sharing efforts.  As discussed, 
this can be facilitated by standardization.  The model demonstrates that by 
improving the accuracy of the risk assessment the cost of securitized 
financing decreases.  With contracts lasting 20 years or more, acquisition of 
data will be a long process.  The alternative is to reduce the burden of excess 
overcollateralization by establishing a public entity to insure the assets, 
reducing the originator’s cost of credit enhancement. 
5.2.1 Credit Enhancement 
  Securitized assets use credit enhancement to attain investment grade 
ratings.  After the financial crisis of 2008, with the collapse of the mortgage 
backed securities market, the cost of credit enhancement increased.  Before 
2007, clean investments could get a AAA rating with around 7% credit 
enhancement.  In 2011, the required rate was over 25% (Herve-Mignucci, et 
al., 2013).  When incorporated into the model, this rate produces an IRR that 
exceeds the viable level.  Government supported loan guarantees or insurance 
could reduce financing costs by lowering the amount of credit enhancement 
required from solar developers (Nelson and Peirpont, 2013). This would be 
similar, although to a lesser degree and lower risk than the insurance backing 
provided to the nuclear energy industry (Zelenika-Zovko and Pearce,  2011). 
 Federal credit enhancement has played a role in the development of 
several industries.  By providing a “first loss” reserve, the government 
guarantees, partially or in full, the liabilities of a project towards its lenders 
(Frisari et al., 2013; Mendelsohn and Feldman, 2013).  This has been done by 
both the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) - mortgage guarantees, and 
the Small Business Administration - business loans guarantees (Sanders et 
al., 2013).   It was also used by the Department of Energy in 2005 to help 
bring innovative, clean energy technologies to market through its 1703 Loan 
Guarantee Program (ACORE, 2013).   
 A similar type of insurance could be developed to support the access 
of renewable energy firms to public capital.  By replacing existing tax 
credits, which incur a dollar-for-dollar loss, with a federal insurance program, 
it is possible for the federal government to both reduce costs and utilize 
leverage to expand solar funding (ASR, 2008).  However, introduction of 
insurance would change the model and alter results related to the formation 
of asset quality.  By relieving firms of the responsibility for covering default 
related losses, moral hazard is introduced and the incentive for firms to 
maintain high quality asset pools is reduced (Herve-Mignucci et al., 2013). 
 
5.3 Purchase of solar ABS and the Investor Rate of Return, r. 
 As the primary determinant of financing costs, actions to reduce the 
required rate of investor return will directly improve the performance of solar 
securitization.  In the model, it is assumed that credit enhancement is 
sufficient to attain an investment grade rating.  If this is true, the principle 
problem in recruiting investors is the lack of liquidity of solar ABS.  
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Unlisted, non-standard securities that are not actively traded in any market 
will require a liquidity premium, and will generally not be purchased by 
institutional portfolio managers (Frisari et al., 2013).  
 
5.3.1 Liquidity 
 Achieving sufficient scale will create liquidity, increase demand for 
solar ABS, and reduce the cost of securitized financing.   In 2011, it was 
estimated that securitization of all residential and commercial rooftop 
contracts could generate $733 million in bonds (Borod, 2013).  Market 
growth since that time would add considerably to this total.  However, 
securitizing many of these contracts would be difficult given their tax equity 
structure.   
 When tax equity finance is used solar developers must typically offer 
investors 15 – 40% of ITC benefits, MACRS benefits, and a share of the 
project’s future cash distributions (Colmer, 2011;Marks, 2012; US PREF, 
2011).  This share can be 90% - 99% of a project’s initial cash flow (S&P, 
2011).  Tax benefits are taken over the first several years of the project 
during the recapture period (Joshi, 2012).  During this time, the financer must 
be recognized as the owner of the asset and the producer of electricity 
(Hechimovich and Stevens, 2012).  If the sale of a PPA to a SPE for the 
purpose of securitization interferes with this ownership claim, tax benefits are 
lost (ASR, 2008; Hintze, 2013).  Assets can be securitized after the recapture 
period, but this can be five or more years into the project, and can do little to 
relieve immediate liquidity concerns.  It is possible to utilize securitization 
before the end of this recapture period, by attaining loans backed by 
developers’ equity positions.  These loans could then be aggregated (Lowder, 
2013).  Even with this option, liquidity cannot be added quickly.  However, 
continued market expansion provides the promise of long-term relief.   
  
6. Conclusions 
 Securitization of solar leases and PPAs has the potential to raise 
significant capital, while reducing project financing costs well below the cost 
of alternative financing.  Realization of this potential can be facilitated by 
policy action to target key points in the securitization process - the formation 
of the asset pool, the process of asset evaluation, and in the purchase of the 
asset by uncertain investors.  Results indicate that actions taken at each of 
these points can affect the cost and efficacy of a securitization.   Using 
appropriate policy to target each of these moments, the efficiency of the 
process can be improved and associated input costs reduced.   Though 
addressing the problems identified will be challenging, with access to the 
vast financial resources of institutional investors as the incentive there is 
significant impetus for making necessary policy changes to expand the 
deployment of PV technology.   
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